In the transaction, select SU10 by login data of users
Query Data from Active Directory
Historically grown authorization structures can be found especially in system landscapes that have been in operation for a long time. Instead of small, modular, job-specific roles, existing roles are continually expanded and assigned to different employees in different departments. While this leads to less administrative work in the short term, it causes the complexity of the role to increase massively over time. As a result, the efficiency of authorization development is increasingly lost.
Typically, users access a table's data through applications rather than directly. If so, you should take precautions and restrict access to sensitive data. End users typically do not access table-level data directly, but the data is displayed in business applications and their display is restricted in context by means of entitlement checks. However, there are cases where generic access to tables via the SE16, SE16N, SM30, SM31 or SM34 transaction is required for administrators, key users, verifiers, etc. For example, a verifier should have read access to all customising tables. However, you do not want to display security-related tables. Key users should be able to access certain reports regularly, but only read information relevant to their work. There are several ways to restrict access to tables by using table tools. This means that users can only access tables or table contents that they want to see. However, we would like to point out that the granting of permissions for these tools in the production environment is considered to be critical to security, since it is very easy to allow access to large amounts of sensitive data in the case of erroneous or excessive permissions. Therefore, only apply these permissions in a restricted way.
Eligibility proposal values
A careless handling of the permissions with sensitive employee data can go quite nicely in the pants. Prevent uncontrolled and extensive reporting access to your HCM data by properly using the P_ABAP authorization object. In many companies, the correct use of P_ABAP is not known. As a result, there are often false expressions that, in the worst case, allow uncontrolled reporting access to all data in the logical database PNPCE (or PNP). This way, you can again erase your access restrictions, which were previously painstakingly defined in a permission concept. Therefore, it is necessary to test the use of P_ABAP in individual cases and to use the existing limitations. In the following we describe the logic behind this authorization object and what it is important to avoid.
Since at least developers in the development system have quasi full authorizations, as mentioned above, concrete access to a critical RFC connection can therefore not be revoked. Since RFC interfaces are defined for the entire system, they can be used from any client of the start system. Existing interfaces can be read out via the RFCDES table in the start (development) system.
During go-live, the assignment of necessary authorizations is particularly time-critical. The "Shortcut for SAP systems" application provides functions for this purpose, so that the go-live does not get bogged down because of missing authorizations.
Note that the SAP_NEW_ individual profiles should be retained themselves, so that at any given time, traceability is ensured as to which release and which permission was added.
This prevents, for example, denial-of-service attacks, which first cause a password to be locked in order to block internal processes.