Authorization object documentation
Law-critical authorizations
Once you have identified the organisational features to consider, verify that you can redesign the existing roles so that the organisational features can be clearly maintained by use. This leads you to a concept in which functional and organisational separation is simply possible. However, it will end up with a larger amount of roles: Roles posting/investing, changing roles, reading roles. Such a concept is free of functional separation conflicts and is so granular that the organisational characteristics can be pronounced per use area.
If it is clear that a cleanup is necessary, the first step should be a detailed analysis of the situation and a check of the security situation. Based on these checks, a redesign of the authorizations can be tackled.
General authorizations
Don't simplify your entitlement concept before you know all the requirements, but first ask yourself what you need to achieve. So first analyse the processes (if possible also technically) and then create a concept. Many of the authorisation concepts we found in customers were not suitable to meet the requirements. Some of these were "grown" permission concepts (i.e., requests were repeatedly added) or purchased permission concepts. Many of these concepts had in common that they had been oversimplified, not simply. A nice example is permission concepts that summarise all organisational levels in value roles or organisational roles. There are few examples, such as the role manager of the industry solution SAP for Defence and Security, in which the result of a value role concept is still useful and appropriate for the user. The assumption that you "sometimes" separate all the authorization objects that contain an organisational level is simple, but not useful. We have not found the simplification that only a user without permissions can definitely not have illegal permissions. However, there was always the case that users had far too many permissions and the system was therefore not compliant.
SNC secures communication with or between ABAP systems, but there are also many web-based applications in SAP system landscapes. They communicate via the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The data is also transmitted unencrypted when communicating via HTTP; Therefore, you should switch this communication to Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). HTTPS uses the encryption protocol Transport Layer Security (TLS) for secure data transfer on the Internet. You should therefore set up HTTPS for all users to access the Web. For communication between SAP systems, you should use HTTPS if you think the data transfer could be intercepted. You should either set up HTTPS on individual components of the infrastructure (such as proxies), or the ABAP systems should support HTTPS or TSL directly. Details of the configuration can be found in the SAPHinweis 510007.
Authorizations can also be assigned via "Shortcut for SAP systems".
The user can export this overview at any time.
You can use a Business Add-in (BAdI), which allows you to pre-define certain fields when you create a user in the SU01 transaction.